Abstract: This paper introduces a utility formulation to the well-known gambler's ruin problem. An agent who maximizes lifetime expected utility has to tradeoff short-term utility against longer-term survival prospects. The optimal tradeoff is established by way of characterizing the agent's value and optimal policy functions. Further, the scope of expected utility maximization is examined by contrasting the bankruptcy probabilities of an agent employing such a criterion with those of an agent who is more directly interested in survival. Economic applications of the theory are also discussed. 
1.

Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the threat of bankruptcy 1 directly affects economic decision-making and that, in the presence of uncertainty, agents may be unable to guarantee survival. Yet the problem of bankruptcy is either not modelled or effectively side-stepped in a number of dynamic economic models. In a general equilibrium model with complete Arrow-Debreu markets (and hence a single lifetime budget constraint), borrowing in the event of negative current net worth is permissible. In portfolio allocation or consumption-savings models in which there are borrowing constraints, a standard assumption is the presence of at least one safe asset; bankruptcy can always be avoided and in an optimal solution, under usual conditions, is in fact avoided. 2 The objective of this paper is to investigate a simple dynamic model in which not all risks can be hedged and agents are restricted in their ability to borrow. I do not propose any general theory but rather study a specific single-agent decision problemthe "gambler's ruin" -which has been widely used in probability theory to analyze bankruptcy, after adapting it appropriately for economic applications. In this model, I examine two questions: maintaining the hypothesis of expected utility maximization, how does an agent optimally trade off utility against survival prospects, at different levels of wealth? Since there is always residual uncertainty, survival cannot be guaranteed in such a model. So, how do the bankruptcy prospects of an expected utility maximizer differ from those of an agent who is more explicitly interested in survival?
The model I study incorporates one important generalization of the gambler's ruin problem. In the classic formulation of that problem (see Dubins-Savage (1965) ) the agent's action is identified with a bet (whose returns are uncertain). Consequently, different actions are distinguishable only from the long-term view of which ones are better suited to survival. In economic applications, actions will correspond to effort or consumption or choice of projects etc., and consequently will need to be distinguished in terms of short-term utility consequences as well. And that is exactly what I do in this paper; I introduce a utility formulation in the pure ruin or pure survival problem. 3 In the formulation studied here, the agent's wealth follows a diffusion process and an action is the choice of the incremental mean and variance of the process (and each action additionally yields some instantaneous utility). I first investigate the maximization of expected discounted lifetime utility (subject, of course, to the bankruptcy constraint). I show that the agent's value function is a strictly increasing, strictly concave C function which satisfies the Bellman differential equation. (The smoothness property and the optimality equation are surprisingly difficult to prove and the approach has to be completely different from that employed in proving the same results in the gambler's ruin problem; this point is explained in greater detail in the sequel). I further show that there is a (stationary) Markov optimal policy for the agent's problem. In this policy, as the agent's wealth increases, he either picks higher variance or lower mean and mean-variance ratios. Indeed when the instantaneous utility function is separable in mean and variance, at higher wealth the agent is more willing to assume risk and picks both a higher variance as well as a lower mean 4 (and consequently higher instantaneous utility).
When agents can, in fact, go bankrupt it is not immediate that expected utility maximization is the only rational decision criterion; indeed people seem to sometimes employ a "pessimistic" criterion like the maximization of survival probabilities instead. I characterize the optimal policy in that case and show that it has a very simple form; it involves a constant action at every instant. Moreover, the optimal action is easily computed and, as the discount rate approaches zero, involves picking the action with the highest mean-variance ratio. By way of comparison, I provide a bound on the ratio of the probability of failure under survival maximization to the same probability under expected utility maximization. I show that, although both probabilities approach zero as the agent's initial wealth becomes unbounded, the rate of approach is faster for survival maximizers and hence the ratio of the two probabilities also tends to zero.
Finally, I show that the generalized gambler's ruin structure covers a number of interesting economic models including the well-known consumption-savings problem (see Deaton (1991) ). I present a brief discussion of that problem under the usual assumption of borrowing constraints as well as the additional assumption of bankruptcy. I demonstrate that this additional constraint can change the optimal consumption policy quite significantly. I also believe that the current framework is sufficiently flexible so that it can be adapted, in future work, to study many-agent problems. That will allow an examination of several questions related to bankruptcy which arise in a market context; the most interesting of these is possibly the Alchian (1950 )-Friedman (1950 argument that firms that do not maximize profits eventually go bankrupt.
In Section 2, I formulate the problem precisely. Section 3 contains results on the pure survival maximization problem while Section 4 presents existence and characterization results for expected utility maximization. Some comparative results and implications are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents two computable examples as well as a discussion of the consumption-savings problem. All proofs are in the appendix.
Basic Definitions and Assumptions
I examine a continuous time 5 optimization model in which the agent's wealth follows a diffusion process; [Y(t): t > 0] on [0, ao) given by a stochastic differential equation
where [B(t): t > 0] is a standard Brownian motion and [m(t),v(t)] are the instantaneous mean and variance of the incremental (normal) distribution dY(t) and these are chosen from a set A. The initial wealth level is denoted y. Suppose further that the process is absorbed at the origin and let T denote the random time of absorption (which could be infinite and whose distribution depends on the strategy followed). The choice [m(t),v(t)] yields a flow payoff at instant t which is denoted U(m(t),v(t)). At the time of absorption the decision maker receives a terminal payment (and from this point on, I normalize this payment to zero). Future payoffs are discounted at a rate 8 6 (O,CD).
The following assumptions on U and A are maintained : I study two distinct control problems. The first, the expected utility maximization problem, is to pick an admissible strategy to maximize expected discounted lifetime payoffs:
For this problem to be interesting we must have U > 0. Optimization involves a tradeoff between instantaneous payoffs and a movement away from zero. A second optimization problem, survival maximization, is to maximize expected discounted time to bankruptcy: (PI) and (P2) are clearly stationary dynamic programming problems, and I shall denote the value functions, respectively, by V.(y) and V«(y). Any solution of (P1)-(P2) will be called an optimal strategy or policy. If a stationary Markov policy is optimal in the class of all admissible strategies, it will be called a stationary Markov optimal policy.
The Survival Problem: Existence and Characterization
In this section I study the simpler optimization problem; survival maximization or (P2). Since such a decision-maker does not have to trade off immediate utility against future wealth, the analysis is considerably simplified; indeed, I demonstrate explicitly the optimal strategy. The agent picks a constant control regardless of his wealth level; the only determinant of this choice is the discount rate.
The pure survival problem has been studied extensively as a gambling problem, first by Dubins-Savage (1965) Further, the criterion itself tends to a maximization of the probability of survival. So this suggests that the optimal policy for the undiscounted problem of maximizing survival probability, is to pick the control with the highest mean-variance ratio. This is similar to the results of Pestien-Sudderth (1985) and Sudderth-Weerasinghe (1989) in somewhat different versions of this problem.
The Expected Utility Problem: Existence and Characterization
In the general problem (PI) there is a tradeoff between immediate payoffs and continuation values; consequently, constant controls are typically not optimal. Hence, it is impossible, except in very special cases, to directly "guess" an optimal policy (and use a verification theorem to establish its optimality); we have to establish the existence of a value function with appropriate differentiability properties and the existence of optimal policies by analytical methods. As I explain below, there is no general result in the optimal control literature, that I am aware of, which directly covers this existence problem. Theorem 4.1 is the existence result for (PI). I then present characterization results for the value and optimal policy function. In particular, I investigate how the optimal action choice changes with the agent's wealth level. Again, the presence of a utility function considerably complicates the analysis.
The following theorem is the basic existence result: There are two main differences between the results. Firstly, Krylov's result is valid when the state space is a compact interval (and indeed it does not seem that the proof would extend to unbounded domains). Secondly the result proved there requires the immediate payoff function U to satisfy a Lipschitz condition (and this rules out standard boundary conditions like Inada conditions). On the other hand, in Krylov's formulation, state dependence in the payoffs is admissible and he does not impose the condition of strict concavity on the payoff function. Furthermore, he allows a more general discounting structure including the undiscounted case, 6=0. Note also that the results from the portfolio allocation literature (for example, Karatzas-Shreve (1987) ) cannot be employed for two reasons: it is critical for those results that there be a risk-free asset and in that problem, given any consumption, the mean and variance necessarily have a linear relationship to each other.
Remark 2:
The result is also valid when the agent stops if he either goes bankrupt or reaches a high level of wealth, i.e. Theorem 4.1 covers the two-sided absorption problem as well. The characterization results that follow can also be derived for this case by employing similar techniques as those used here. Hence, I do not discuss the two-sided absorption problem in this paper.
I turn now to the characterization results: iii) The value function is strictly concave. Further V" is strictly increasing in y.
Remark: The characterization (4.2), which will be seen to be extremely useful, is true even when the immediate payoff function is not concave; in particular, the strict concavity and monotonicity of the value function require neither monotonicity nor concavity of the utility function.
strategy is given by the (unique) maximizer of the Bellman equation (4.1). From that equation it immediately follows that as the agent becomes wealthier, the change in his optimal mean-variance choice is (partly) determined by the behavior of the local risk-aversion index, V", and the marginal valuation, V', in y. But evidently knowing the behavior of these two indices alone, which knowledge can be inferred from Theorem 4.2, is not sufficient; from (A.20) the reader can see that what we need to know is how V"/V', the coefficient of relative risk aversion, changes in y. Although, in general, this information is impossible to deduce, I now present results which develop alternative and increasingly more detailed characterizations of /?*, under some further restrictions. Remark: Proposition 4.3 holds without any assumptions whatsoever on U. It is my conjecture that under monotonicity and strict concavity restrictions on U, both i) and ii) will hold for an optimal policy; I have however been able to prove this only under some further conditions. I do have counterexamples to show that, without concavity assumptions, only i) or ii) but not both need hold (see Section 6).
fP is said to be an interior optimal policy if 0*(y) G int A, for all ye I R , . Further, the optimal policy ft* is a one to one function. and increasing in v, then U(m',v') > U(m,v) . In an optimal policy at low wealth levels, the decision-maker picks lower utility actions which have however larger means and smaller variances.
If the feasible set A has more structure, one can even dispose of the interiority assumption. We say that A is a 
A Comparative Analysis of Expected Utility and Survival Maximization
In this section I present some results on the comparative survival properties of expected utility and survival maximizing agents. I will contrast the probability of failure under the optimal policies implied by each of those criteria; from Theorem 3.1 we know that this probability is strictly positive for both decision-makers. Note that since I consider a discounted problem, the appropriate index is Ee~ ; (1 -Eec onverges to the survival probability as 8 j 0).
It will be instructive to begin with a discussion of the comparative survival properties of myopic utility maximization; a myopic utility maximizer picks the I turn now to comparing expected utility maximization against survival maximization. Since expected utility maximization does not have a simple representation for its optimal policy, the estimate here is going to be less precise. Let p be the relative survivability of an expected utility maximizer 
Two Examples and An Economic Application
In this section I first present two simple computable examples of expected utility maximization. The examples show that a variety of policies are consistent with optimality. Since computable examples are hard to come by when controls have direct payoffs, the examples will have an artificial flavor; strong resrictions will be placed on the payoff function U and feasible set A to facilitate computation. In particular, the convexity assumptions which were used to prove Theorem 4.1 will not be satisfied by these examples (and that does not create problems because the verification result, that a solution of (4.1) and an associated stationary Markov policy are in fact optimal, is true even without such convexity restrictions). In this example, the relative risk-aversion index, -V"/V', decreases in y. Hence, in the optimal solution, the lower the wealth level the more conservative the agent's choice; the mean increases (and consequently the variance increases) as y increases-although the mean-variance ratio decreases at the same time. By a procedure identical to that of the previous example it is possible to show that V(y) = k(y+b) a and 0(y) = -(y+b)/c, (y+b/c) 2 for k > 0, 1> c> 0 and a G (0,1). So in this example, the mean decreases while the variance and the mean-variance increase in y; the intuition is similar to that given above.
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Remark: In these examples, the feasible control set is not compact. However, it follows from a theorem in Karatzas and Shreve (1987, Proposition 2.13, p.291) that there are diffusions consistent with each of the exhibited strategies. A standard argument, but in two steps, then shows that V is an upper bound for the returns to arbitrary strategies, and that this bound is attained by p. The first step is an argument for the truncated problem on state space [0,k] and then, in the second step, let k-»a).
I turn now to a brief discussion of two economic applications of the current analysis -the optimal consumption/savings problem of an agent subject to stochastic labor income and principal-agent models.
The consumption-savings problem (see, for example Yaari (1976) , Schechtman (1976) and for a more recent treatment, Deaton (1991) ) investigates the nature of the optimal consumption policy for an agent subject to uncertain income. The recent literature has emphasized limited borrowing opportunities and indeed has focussed on the case where the agent is completely unable to borrow (although he can lend). One insight of this literature is that in the presence of borrowing constraints, an agent will use his wealth as a buffer and smooth consumption by accumulating wealth; in the limit as the discount rate and interest rate go to zero, we get the permanent income hypothesis, that an agent will consume exactly his mean income every period, if he can (see Schechtman (1976) and also Deaton (1991) ).
An important assumption in this literature is that wealth is always invested in a safe asset and labor income is strictly positive in all states of the world, i.e. there is no bankruptcy. The current analysis can be used to determine the consequences of incorporating bankruptcy in the above problem (in addition to the zero borrowing condition). In particular it can be shown that, unlike the standard model, as the discount rate goes to zero, the optimal consumption at all wealth levels goes to zero as well. This result is proved in the appendix and should be contrasted with the permanent income hypothesis result discussed above.
One other economic application may be briefly mentioned. In the principal-agent literature, incentive schemes which require an agent to maintain output above a given performance index or else face dismissal have been widely studied. The agent's best response problem when faced with such a dismissal scheme is an example of the control problem studied in this paper (see Dutta-Radner (1991) for details). 
Proofs of Section
Proofs of Section 4
It is simpler for a logical development of the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 to actually prove them in approximately the reverse order. More precisely, I will first prove that the value function is increasing and, if C , satisfies (4.2). This will be used to prove Theorem 4.1 after which I will conclude by proving Theorem 4.2iii).
Proof of Theorem 4.2 i)
Consider two initial states y and y' with y' > y. A candidate policy from y' is: use the constant control that generates U (say a) till the first time the state hits y. Thereafter, use -K where -K is e-optimal from y. Since e is arbitrary and U > V(y), it follows from (A.I) that the value function is monotonically increasing (it will in fact be seen to be strictly monotonic from the strict concavity property that we will shortly prove). The proof of Theorem 4.1 will be in two steps.
Step 1.
Consider the k-step truncated optimization problem, in which the agent controls the diffusion process starting at some y G (0, k), where k > 0. The process is absorbed the first time it hits either 0 or k. Let V, denote the value function for this problem. Continue to assume that returns after absorption are normalized to zero, irrespective of whether the absorption was at y = 0 or y = k. Lemma A.I i) V, is C and is the unique solution to the constrained Bellman equation
ii) There is M < m, independent of k, such that l|V k || + ||V£|| + ||V£'|| < M (A.11)
where ||-|| denotes the sup-norm.
Step 2. I shall then let k ] OD, and argue that limits are well-defined and indeed define the value function of the k = OD problem, i.e. prove ensure that the solution for c is a fraction we need some restrictions; a sufficient condition is that 20+7 < 1/2 and 25 > (4-20-7)(1-20-7).
